

~~I mention this because of a certain parallel that I think is very close.~~

Just say that talking at Harvard you can ask to meet with a small group from ^{Harvard} that had a particular interest in education and nuclear war and nuclear threat and so we tried to assemble a small and highly relevant group. There will be other people coming in later, not just Larry Goldbrock, ^{Kohlberg} but some others who are teaching and will be coming in as time goes on. I thought I would just say for his benefit that there is an effort going on here; that is a course has begun on education ^{and} nuclear war here.

Dept
of
Education
Faculty
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"Education in the Nuclear Age," I believe is the title.

Which is sponsored by _____ and Eleanor Duckworth who will be coming in later. Your coming here at this time is particularly relevant to activities ^{already} going on and I hope that out of this discussion can come some steps.

D.E.- Is that ^{your} particularly then of the people here right now?

Noel is the one who is directly ^{involved in it} following.

D.E.- What does it involve?

Bobby Snow is actually running the course. She's an educator who has helped form a group called Educators' ^{for} Social Responsibility, which is a parallel group to Lawyers' ^{for} Social Responsibility and Physicians' for Social Responsibility.

D.E.- It includes teachers of all kinds.

That's right. Public school teachers of the United States.

D.E.- That's right, it's public school teachers, not college teachers.

Intro: Re ESR etc + Bobby
That's right. Secondary school teachers, principally, although they have some *primary school teachers* as well.

TAPE #7
HARVARD School of Education (Faculty Seminar)
They organized the Day of [?] last October, which was a national day of activities in ^{a thousand} schools around the country. ^{- teachers.} She's running the course. Our hope is the course would become a ^{permanent} curriculum course inserted in the school of education catalog school, ^{course on Education Peace issues, or} something of the equivalent. What we wanted to do first was try out various approaches to a course like this and have some feeling ^{as} to the materials that are available and the general question, ^{the organizing} questions for a course in a school like this one. We have fifteen students.

D.E.
I just came back from Germany and (a week there) I was asking somebody one evening what people thought about the Nazi period because I've grown up with the question in my mind that all Jews and all Americans: How did the Germans come to do this? How did the Germans do this? How did this get done by Germans? ^{I can't entirely} Explained ^{why I focused on it that way, but I always did. Incl. I.} why I focused on it. Studied that ever since.

So It was interesting to ask these people now. I've been to Germany a half-dozen times in the last couple of years and it's a delicate question to raise. I realized that I hadn't in fact really pressed anybody on it until now. Now I felt I knew the issue enough to say, "How do you understand what was going on here and what could have been done?" The first question I got was that the younger generation knows nothing about the Nazi Period. ^{And I heard} from ^(taking off on your comment about a public school) because I also just came from the Vietnam Seminar ^{U.S.C.} which billed itself as the first Vietnam Retrospective Symposium. ^{Three days.} Although there actually have been a couple of others, ^{of which they were unaware} there hasn't been much

and I mention this because a certain parallelism is very close. A number of people in Germany said, as follows: We start with the Greeks or the Romans, or ^{Bismark,} whoever it is, and we never get to 1930. That's always in the last week, and we always run over, and we never get to it. You've heard that before, ^{right?} People here say, "we do not get to Vietnam." They're not learning anything about it. When I speak to a college audience now, I've learned that I must explain what ^{Quesar} ~~Cason~~ was, or Calley, if it comes up. Anything like that. They know nothing about Vietnam. It ^{does not mean they are} ~~is not~~ without curiosity, however.

Q. It sounds just like Russia.

D.E. They are very interested. The Germans don't get to it. ^{So they said} They know nothing about it. I said, "well what do they think about it?" Several Germans said to me, "there have been a number of professors who have asked their classes at different levels, college, highschool, what does the name Hitler mean to you?" The answer is, "he built roads, bombs, stopped un-employment, killed the Jews (that was very bad), there were some goodthings and there were some bad things. They have a sort of parallel column. One final thing ^{(reminding me of the U.S. & the Vietnam} Seminar I just came from). Last year was the 40th anniversary of Stalingrad, ^{the battle of Stalingrad,} which led to great outpouring of retrospective on Stalingrad. Mostly by former generals. ~~IX~~ ^{It} Two people told me all took the form of what we could have done better at Stalingrad. How Hitler mucked up. In fact the major complaint against Hilter is that he overreached his amateurism and he mucked up the military.

Q That was the general picture in Winds of War, too.

^{Screwed it up, right?}

D.E. I've noticed something very interesting on education on Vietnam. I have been part of now three major series, one by the BBC, another American one, where I have spoken on Vietnam (retrospective ^{by} ten years after). ~~IX~~ ALL of the other

members are (McGeorge Bundy, Westmoreland) all of them without exception are officials of that doomed war, ALL. I look at it and say, well so I'm balanced.

I was an official too.

No one on the program was not an official. There were Americans involved in war, who were not, did not have actual ^{official} responsibility. Some supported it,

some did not support it. But the war is being portrayed retrospectively to

the public ENTIRELY through the eyes of the officials who ran it and who

never stopped it. I differed from the others only in one respect. My involvement

of course was not as high as the others on the whole, but it was with them, ^{they were}

my colleagues, they were the

next level above. So I knew, I could see it from their eyes. I changed to

be against the war, so the official who changed to be against the war and

(only one in a way, who was that ^{active} actor.) I'm the spokesman for the anti-war

movement, and clearly I'm there for my credentials as a former official. Someone

who saw things responsibly, who understood, who could be compassionate,

and to a certain degree, and so forth. ^{The comparison w/ the Stalingrad thing is 100%.} One hundred percent that no one has

a voice authoritatively to interpret this to the public (and of course I, as

somebody who has studied the war)

I'm very conscious of the limitations of the perspective of these

guys. ^{Partly humanly, because of course} ~~THEY'RE~~ They're totally defensive and apologetic about it. But partly

because they had a certain role ^{point of} perspective that limited them at the time

and limits them still, and one should expect that. ^{and} This is the way it's to be

interpreted to the public. ^{Now} When we hear this about Germany, don't we regard

that as ^a sinister (almost) development for the future? The Germans are not allowed

to learn more ^{critically} about their past history? I would say it's exactly true about

what's happening ^{or} on Vietnam.

Q: Could you talk personally for a moment about how you moved from that perspective. what enabled you to change?

Q: Real easy question! (laugh)

I was just curious as to how does

education ^{all,} look back on his experience.

Well, I could go at that with a lot of angles. I've been talking to John Mack, so it happens (who is interested in this question and I was with him on this it yesterday) ^{I have} some reluctance to go over exactly the same material, ^{which isn't very new.}

In these various lectures I'm giving here I'm enjoying it because I'm pretending to myself that everybody is at the same lecture and I can for once not repeat myself. As I go across the country, many hundreds of campuses, I'm just there for one night, and I always feel I have to give sort of the most important thing. So I say the same things to everybody. Could I interpret your question?

Could I focus just on something that I haven't heard myself say recently? ^{without being comprehensive about it or totally responsive}
The Factor ^{or} ~~is~~ that I didn't talk too much ^{with him} about is the deeply ingrained notion of obedience to authority as almost the highest moral attribute ^{of} that people so far as they can see themselves as being in an organization in a broader sense.

In anything but face-to-face, intimate, personal relationships, in school, in team work, in jobs, in cities and ^{as citizens of} ~~in the~~ country - wherever there is an official spokesperson or a hierarchical structure, I have come to believe, I have now come to believe; in a way that I was not aware ^{earlier, that} ~~that~~ not only ^{reflexive} the conscious sense of obligation to authority, but the unconscious ^{reflects} habitual and deeply motivated desire to be a loyal member of the team including ^{loyalty} subordinate ^{of its authority.} structure. ~~This~~ is not easily distinguishable from what we perceived in the

Germans during World War II. I'm talking about a phenomenon that when I was growing up, as I started to say, during World War II was very well defined in World War II movies as a German characteristic. ^{The Good German.} They were always following orders. The ~~Fuhrer~~ ^{Fuhrer} principle, the country and so forth. ^{It} ~~It~~ seemed to me to define, ^{we were} led to believe, ~~to find~~ the difference between America and Germany. Germany was at one pole and we were at the other. Now, the behavior that I observed in the Pentagon and Vietnam did not demonstrate such a difference. ^{And} I'll say that at the time that I did ~~split~~ ^{split} from that and began to see my superiors, ^{to} whom I owed the truth, as being the American people, ^{(which} ~~It's~~ ^{is} an enormous psychological shift, as opposed to the official authority ^{es} of the Executive branch) I looked back at the

colleagues that I first thought would join me in this, and they didn't.

There was nobody there. So, I explained that to myself for years as kind of conscious careerism and cowardice on their part and I was quite judgmental of them on those grounds ^{for several years} because you have to know one fact which I find most

Americans don't know. I was not more against the war than nearly everyone

I knew in the government. ^{And} I say that still. By any standards of being against

the war in ^{cognitive} terms, everybody ^{was} ~~is~~ against the war, by that time. Actually

after the Tet Offensive of 1968. The war was run, (let's put it this way first.)

The Pentagon was staffed by people who after TET and the ones I knew, ^{or before Tet, in} '68,

^{believed} ~~where~~ ^{that} the war was at best hopeless, (and I say at best because not many of them perceived it as a crime, although some did.) Wrong or immoral. At best, it

was hopeless ^{stagnate} and to send money or troops or kill people was to do so in a

cause ~~XXXX~~ where it could achieve no benefit to U.S. interests in any way and

should stop. The Pentagon Papers were written by about 35 people who were

chosen in part because they had all been in Vietnam, or at least had worked

on Vietnam in the Pentagon. Most of them had been in Vietnam. ^{It} Came out ~~and~~ —

attention focused on that team when Pentagon Papers were ^{released} ~~realized~~ ~~by~~ the fact

that they were all against the war. People thought HA, this is an inside job

of some kind, critics of the war. ^{They were} Random selection of anybody ^{who had been to} ~~in~~ Vietnam.

Everybody was against the war. The only reason they were chosen was they

had experience. To have experience was to be against the war. Now, it's true

that I was the only member of the team who put the information out. That's

the question you're asking. But, the war was run by people who were against

the war. ^{Not} In 1965, ^{or} 1966, ^{but} increasingly by '67 and universally by '68, the war

had seven years to run. The question I began to face, how can they be

this obedient? ^{compliant, this} There was a phrase in Washington in '68. There were three

people in this town who believe in what we're doing. Lyndon Johnson, Dean Rusk,

and ^{Walt Rostow. That was not exaggeration;} Nobody could think of anybody else. ~~XX~~ Top to bottom. It

did not slow ^{the bombing} by a single bomb. The war got done. That interested me very much. I saw it first of all as kind of a character flaw, of obedience. They just didn't have the guts to do what I was doing. I was well-known to have guts in certain ways. To take risks when I thought it was necessary. ~~MMM~~ Often in Vietnam when it wasn't necessary, I took risks, I was a risk taker. For that reason alone, I was singled out by people who knew me as the one who ^{had} given the Pentagon Papers ^{before my} name identified. As the one of that team who ^{Some of the others were notably cautious.} had the guts. There were other people like me who, if they had access, ^{been logical suspects.} would have ^{had been} done. What I'm coming to is this. It was not until I read Milgrim's book, Obedience to Authority (have you all read that?). Let me ask, have you read the book as opposed to a paper? I find that a lot of people have read papers, but not read the book. I read both ^{the} papers and the book, and I find that the comprehensive version of the book much more persuasive. That to me was a great ^{eye-opener} revelation because it reveals to me that what I was looking at was a phenomenon obviously more deeply ingrained than simple opportunism. It is interesting, I note now, that Milgrim hadn't done this cross-culturally. Found that there was a difference between Germans and Americans in this respect. It was not very good. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Statistically significant difference, but very small. Germans themselves have a very great self image, I found in a matter of weeks. They ~~M~~ like order, they like neatness, they like everybody to be on time. It's plausible that has a - they're different from ^{chaotic} pioneering Americans, "cowboys". It turns out that when it comes down to dumping a million tons of bombs a year on a country that you don't hate and have given up hope of ^{dominating}, Americans will do it. They Get the job done, ^{as well as} as if we were Germans. I say the mood changed ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ^{rest of} irreversibly in '68 and never changed back. By May of 1970, (I remember the day very well when I first read, it was during riots in Washington over Cambodia,) and the ^{poll} first came out and said ~~M~~ for the first time, the Harris Poll said the majority of the Americans regard the war as immoral. Typically read in the media, Americans turned against the war because we were losing too many people. It wasn't because ~~XX~~ it was immoral.

That's wrong. They said, ^{in the beginning} continuation of the war is immoral and the majority of the Americans ^{from} at that point on, said that we were wrong to get in. This is not true of elites, it is true of the public. ^{It is} Untrue of elites and I think the media talked about themselves when they said we never saw ^{the war as "immoral"}. Still, in 1970 - after 1970 we dumped more than... MacNamara, whom I revered a great deal at that time, because of his hatred of nuclear weapons, which was my basis of my loyalty to him and ^{that's why} I followed him in ventures that I felt ~~IX~~ were misguided such as Vietnam because I thought he was the best hope for moving us away from reliance on ^{nuclear} new weapons. Of course there is an historical irony there. His way of moving us away from nuclear weapons was to give the Joint Chiefs non-nuclear capabilities with which to ^{pursue imperial} ~~prosecute~~ ventures without nuclear weapons. So he made enough troops available, ^{so then} in Vietnam ^{to then} to have run Vietnam for three years without calling reserves. ~~Make~~ Vietnam possible. I was part of that. I would have to say I was fully a part of that, because I hated nuclear weapons so much. (I'll by-pass here, but I'll just note). The error that I see ^{that he} made at that point was to try to move the system away from nuclear weapons with as little challenge to the basic premises ^{of} to the system as possible. That meant ^{without at all} ~~that either~~ questioning of cold war framework or the ambitions of the system, merely in trying to provide alternative means for achieving the same goals. ^{the} result was Vietnam, to a very large degree. That's why I'm against the draft now, though other people see ^{other things in it.} things in conflict ^{with} Ted Kennedy ^{on that.} People say we need more soldiers, etc. ^{white} I'm so conscious of the blank check that that draft, ^{gives a President} when it comes to expanding ^{a war} that I'm not so worried about the small regular army, whether it's black or yellow or whatever, that will force the president to go back to Congress in the course of the war for more troops, ^{if he has to get them}.

What I'm saying: ^{at} the heart of that draft and everything else is a very conscious and secret desire of the people I was working with to avert
 JCS pressure for nuclear weapons. Troops instead of nuclear weapons. What we are seeing right now is this: the assumption ^{that} that didn't

work.' It didn't work in Korea and the conclusion of the Joint Chiefs was:
"never again without nuclear weapons." That erroded over a course of ten years
because the Soviets got nuclear weapons, and it didn't look as reasonable, ^{to rely on nuc weapons.}
So we built up an army instead and sent 500,000 troops over. After Vietnam
they said: "We were right the first time." That's where we are now. Never
again without nuclear weapons. We're not sending 500,000 troops, ^{next time} That is
the reason for ~~the~~ ^{The} what is really over two trillion dollar buildup of both
nuclear and non-nuclear. Most of it is for non-nuclear, but it's understood
that the purpose is not to send 500,000 troops anywhere, the purpose is to
to back up the first 100,000 with nuclear weapons.

MacNamara started the bombing, which is an interesting ^{story in itself.} ~~historically.~~
McNaughton and I (my boss) (former ^{ly} Harvard law school) totally against the
bombing. We went along with it out of loyalty to MacNamara. ^{we didn't resign, but we} Totally thought
he was wrong. MacNamara came to be disillusioned in the bombing. Saw it
wasn't working and used his efforts to limit it, rather effectively. Starting
in '64, ^{but particularly in 77.} ~~XXXXXX~~ He was fired for that reason up to the World Bank, so that
he would not join the Bobby Kennedy campaign with his creticisms. To keep his
mouth shut, ^{and} he did keep his mouth shut. When he left in March of '65 we had
dropped on Indo China as much tonage of bombs as we had dropped on all of Europe
in World War II. A million and a half tons of bombs. In the rest of that
year under ^{Wernke} ~~Warrenky~~ and Clifford, who are perceived correctly as putting a
lid on the war, mainly on the ground troops. Clifford and ^{Wernke} ~~Warrenky~~ set out to
put a ceiling on the ground troops and they now did it more boldly than McNamara
ever had done. They went public. Clifford did something that McNamara had never
done. He made public interpretations of presidential policy that went far beyond
what Lyndon Johnson had decided, ^{that committed Johnson.} He said, ^{will} very soon after TET there ~~would~~ be
no more troops. Johnson had by no means decided that, but once the Secretary of
Defense said it, it was hard to back away from it. ^{so he} Put a ceiling on troops.
He worked to get us into negotiations, and as Clifford told me he used up his

lifelong credit with Lyndon Johnson. By the end of that end he failed to get a Christmas card from Lyndon Johnson, literally. There came a point where he never saw Johnson alone. He used up his credit with Lyndon Johnson and he did put ^{the} a ceiling on the troops. There isn't one American in a thousand who has worked on this problem who knows the following fact: we doubled the tonage of bombing between March of '68 and January of '69, when Nixon came in. We dropped as many tons of bombs under Clifford and ^{Wernke} ~~Warrenky~~, 1.7 million tons, as MacNamara had dropped in the preceeding four years. ^{they} Substituted bombs for troops. That's what Nixon proceeded to do, ^{from then on.} Nixon came in and is still perceived with all his faults as having ended the war in Vietnam. ^{It} Took him too long to do it, but he ended the war. He dropped $4\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of bombs on Vietnam. Two WWIIs because in WWII altogether we dropped ² million tons. Half a million we dropped in the Pacific. Nixon dropped that much ($\frac{1}{2}$ million tons) secretly on Cambodia and northern Laos, saying that we were not at war with either of those countries and ~~XXXXX~~ lying to Congress about it. The lie was in writing and was known to thousands of Americans who prepared, not just false reports, but ^{dual} reports, ^{true} reports that went up the chain to their boss, and simultaneously at the next desk, false reports ^{and} top secret to be given to the President and Congress. One sergeant of thousands doing that took the example of the Pentagon Papers ^{(I'm told by} and ^{his lawyer)} chose to send documents proving this to Senator Hughes. Documents were crucial, because when Hughes then charged this ~~and~~ Congress and the Pentagon totally denied it, he then said: "Oh, then I have cables, ~~secret~~." Why did Sergeant Franks do that? Because he thought incorrectly the President was being lied to, and he didn't know any way to get the information up the chain, ^{which he knew was sending it up.} rather than get it to Congress. ^{That's where he was wrong} One Captain revealed, later, the secret bombing of North Vietnam which was then pinned on General Level, as having done it on his own. One Captain, thousands of Americans knew that false reporting was going on about bombing a country we weren't suppose ^{to be} at war with. Franklin Roosevelt had said throughout the war in the Pacific, we are only fighting Nazi, all this stuff with Japanese

¹⁵
~~was~~ only propaganda. We're not at war with them and when ^{Sianak} we're being bombed, we said bull shit. Here's the phenomena, ^{then, that I was confronting} This FANTASTIC obedience, and as I say ^{Milgram} revealed to me, you're dealing with here a human propensity, at least in our industrial civilization, and it's definitely not just German and not just American; but it is a propensity that is going to end industrial civilization. It is going to end "civilized life" as we -
"civilization" as we know it. ^{It's} Going to end civilization as we know it, not just in interpersonal relationships, ^{aspects} McDonald's and so forth. It's going to end cities in the northern hemisphere. That obedience is going to do it, combined with the willingness of our leaders to give certain kinds of orders.

One last thought. Just on experiential basis from the military. ^{And} By this time I ^{had} served with the military (in the Marines ^{for 2 years,} also been with the military for the next twelve years). When ^{Mile} took place, I had no doubt of one fact, Cally had his own peculiar characteristics. He was a weak person, an incompetent person, very insecure. I had no doubt of the following fact, ^{which all evidence has indicated} Only one thing was necessary to make Cally do what he did; an order. ^{The} Personality ^{was irrelevant} next to that. I have no doubt that he had been ordered to do that. To this day, by the way, Americans live with ^{the myth that it was} him yet, a question whether Cally was correct in saying he had been ordered or not. ^{That's a national myth.} That's absurd. ^{Of course} Cally was ordered to do that and not only by his Captain, but entirely all the way up the chain of ^{Command} and they all knew it. The other guys simply got off, that's all. The media and everybody else is cooperating saying that it was just Cally. My point here is that anybody who had been in that situation knew an order will do it and without the order it would not have been done, probably not have been done, ^{It} could have been done, Conceivably, without an order a person could do it on his own, but an order is sufficient and almost necessary. Massacres in fact were not - Herbert Kalman has written an article which I just read two days ago in '73 on the subject of sanctioned massacres, and of course if you study

genocide or you study massacres of various kinds you find almost ^{all of them} ~~all~~ the ^{are} ~~are~~ ^{in the sense that} large sanctioned massacres they are either permitted or ordered by what is recognized as ^{legitimate} ~~general~~ authority. ^{And} without that permission, whatever you can say about the underlining motives that make it possible to carry out the massacre, it doesn't happen unless the authority structure has sanctioned it.

Q: ^{Does it have to} ~~can that~~ be explicit, or can it be tacit?

A: It can be tacit, but you know, I think in more cases than not, you find that it wasn't all that tacit. Take the kind of ^{wording} ~~working~~ one finds. We have the testimony that the man in charge of the Philages ¹⁵⁷⁵ was overheard getting a phone call from a guy saying I've got 25 civilians here, what should I do with them? Remember his answer. The fact that he is asked shows that it isn't entirely clear and he says, "that's the last time you ^{will} ~~were~~ ^{me} asking a question like that, you know perfectly well what to do with them." Massive laughter throughout the thing. Is that tacit?

Q: No that is not tacit.

D.E: But it does show that they needed a little....that's true of ~~XX~~ old studies of lynching, when people look into lynching. When people look into lynch mobs they discover that far from being uprising, totally spontaneous, in virtually every case, when ^{you} ~~you~~ look at the fine grain of that process, they discovered that ^a ~~the~~ local authority gave a clear indication that this was something that had to be done. On the subject of education, I raise several issues. One is the importance of history, but history from a point of view. History of our massacres and history of the role of command and obedience in the process of massacre (and I raise the question of how, I'm sure awareness is part of ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{my} answer to the question,) but in general how to educate people to be less

for
available ~~in~~ massacres. Because although massacres are going on today at
a tremendous rate, all over the world, sanctioned by every ^{kind of} society that we
can see, many by us at this very moment; the old-fashioned massacres ^{with} by knife
and gun, don't threaten ^{survival} ~~survivors~~ anymore than in the past, even local ^{1?} on the
whole. The population continues to grow. But certain kinds of massacres are
being planned now and preparation is being carried out very efficiently and
obediently and of course at different ^{locations}. Man will not survive
these massacres. The question is how can we stop the ^{preparations for the} massacre of the urban
populations of the northern hemisphere, which is now underway in our country
and in the Soviet Union.

Q: You'd think further education question'

(Health)?
~~would help,~~

which I think is one of the questions. The story was that of the people
who were in authority, including people like McNamara, for whom you have a fair
respect, that somehow within the framework in which they were operating,
they were objecting to the war, but rendered ^{unable} to act. I asked you one question
which was how act. But there is another question. In 1970, you said
the Harris Poll showed that the majority of Americans labeled this war as
immoral, a label that was not being attached by the people who were running
the war, ^{machine,} was not being joined to action. That to me is a more profound educational
question, because it suggests that ^{while it's} ~~what's~~ true that there are a few people like
you who can do a remarkable amount to break open a system like that, and a
lot of people like Cally who will in fact do what they are told, ^{no matter what they are told,} There is a
potential outside of certain frameworks to make judgments that get lost that
are inside the authority's framework.

D.E. Yes, that's not too hard to explain, by the way.

Q I would assume those are less educated. The insiders were highly educated.

in a mass way.
Good point. First of all there are two questions of education, If we exclude even the handful of top leaders, or the president (try to single future presidents out, ^{as} we could in England - educate Prince Charles). ^{how do you want to} There are two ^{we don't have that precisely here,} unless ^{you are a Rockefeller} large scale ^{parts} sets of educational ^{that are of} interests. One is of the basically elite education, because people are trained to work closely ^{far} with presidents. ^{At Harvard,} So ^{specifically} we have their education. Then we have the general education of people who are voters and tax payers and soldiers. We have two types of behavior. From one point of view, the behavior is ^{very} ~~similar~~ similar. You're drawing attention to the fact that in some respects it's not so similar. People outside were making judgments ^{that} and the insiders were not, ^{making}. One aspect of that is a language phenomenon. The word "immoral", or "evil", or "sinful", is absolutely ^{in the elite.} ^{I. L. Robbie} a disqualification for membership, I was told that ~~Elrobie~~ ^{Robbie} once said that he ^{was} used the word evil once in a report (General Robbie), ^{and} not only lost membership in that committee, but ^{was} never again invited to be in a committee. It so happens that I think I've read the report he's talking about. It's ^a very significant ^{one}. It ^{was} ~~is~~ classified. It's at the heart of my problem. It ^{was} ~~is~~ so classified. It was the report of the general advisory commission under Oppenheimer in Nov. '49 on whether or not to ~~XXXX~~ have a crash program to build a H-bomb. ^{Fermi} ~~Phermie~~ and Robbie and ~~Phermie~~ wrote a minority version of that report (I had it in my hand a hour ago). The report recommended against the crash program, unanimously. However, Truman decided, on other advice, to have a crash program, ^{for the H-bomb} and this led to ~~the~~ ^{was} associated with ^{development of our} the second design laboratory at the University of California. All of our nuclear weapons from the Hiroshima bomb to the ^{neutron} ~~hydrogen~~ bomb have all been designed at ^a the University. One University. The University of California has given us all of our ^{nuclear weapons.} Two campuses, Los Alamos and Livermore are listed ~~XXX~~ as campuses of the University of California. Los Alamos has extra territoriality. You can live in Los Alamos and vote in California elections without filing absentee ballots. There are voting booths set ^{up} ~~out~~ for California elections. ^{in Los Alamos} During the war it was run by the University of California and after the war it became part of the U. of C. . Livermore was not ^{set up} in the competition.

The first director of it was Herb York in '52. York has told me, he recently published the report of the general advisory committee. ^{SSI 01. He} Mentions in the book that he had never seen it as director of Livermore, he didn't have the need to know. ^{It was history - it had been written 3 years earlier.} He never had access to it, and he said, "you know it was really you who suggested to me that I should get ahold of this report thirty years later."

^{He said} The Pentagon Papers came out and the Pentagon Papers led to the freedom of information act amendments for classified information. He said he had decided to use that and asked for the report. He finally saw it, and he said he had only heard of it from Teller and Lawrence, who of course are ^{total} ^{her}. They had said, by the way, ^{that it was a} meaningless report, ^{the} predictions were all wrong, ^{it was} miserable science, they were warped by their view that it was immoral. It was simply a document saying H-bombs are immoral. "Big explosives are immoral - we don't want anything more to do with it. He never bothered to look at the report. As he says in the book, the predictions were remarkably accurate ^{even 30 yrs later} and the reasoning was totally sound and the recommendation not to build an H-bomb was not only reasonable, but correct. This is York saying ^{this.} his life was spent designing and supervising the design of the H-bomb. It's a very remarkable statement by somebody. "I mis-spent my life," is a good paraphrase. After reading his support, the reasoning was right and they knew what they were talking about. ⁹ This is no minor case study. This is the crossing of the threshold. It in fact will have destroyed humanity. If humanity is destroyed, one can look back and say this is the crossing. Not the earlier one, the atom bomb. The atom bomb promised destruction on the same level as our previous high-explosive bomb. It merely permits you to do it faster and more efficiently ^{is as follows:} with fewer planes. The reason the H-bomb went ahead, ^{In '49 a study was done} called the Harmon report was has just been de-classified, which shows to be ^{the} horror of the ^{JSC}, ^{that the SAC} ^{hundred} Plan to use several atom bombs on Russia would not stop the Russian armies ^{from} taking over all of Europe. It would do approximately the damage to Russia that we did to Germany in WWII. The reason is the atom bomb

in the language of the ^{weaponer} ~~lebaner~~, as they call themselves, makes a ^{hole} ~~whole~~ in a city. In Hiroshima, everyone was killed with a certain radius, ^{But} half the people ^{in Hiroshima, which was only a} (medium sized city) only half died, ^{where most of} another half lived, in that small city. That's what atom bombs do. They make wholes in the city, ^{the} people live. ^{The} Damage to be expected in late '49 from several hundred atom bombs was ^(you would think this was an underestimate, but it isn't) about 2 million dead out of a population of 200 million. END OF SIDE 1. It turns

out that the original design. Until now everybody has known for many years there was a difference between Teller's design of the ^{original} H-bomb and the design that finally worked, which Teller also invented. It turns out that the original design would not have worked. It's very highly classified, very closely held, what the difference in those designs was. Something that has just been de-classified ~~that~~ makes it clear what it was. The difference in design is not important ^{to this discussion,} but the difference in effect is, ^{important - that} The design, Teller was heading for was a design that if it worked, would be literally ^{of} unlimited explosive power. ^{meaning that it would be} Quite cheap and technically easy, if you could do it at all. Basically it's a question if you could burn deterium with this ~~H~~ bomb, if you could make ~~deterium~~ burn with heat, you could burn any amount of it (and ^{was} ~~deterium~~ is cheap and available.) So, it was only limited by ^{the delivery capacity.} Further Atom bomb is like this. You put this in a room full of deterium and you have a very big explosion. If that's not big enough, fill the house, fill the building. It's easy. Fill the world up with deterium. You could blow the world up, you could split it apart. There's no limit to it. This was what Teller was trying to design, and this is what authorities was not a good idea to design. What the majority said was 'this is necessarily a weapon of genocide. It is - can only be used against cities, basically, because they thought you couldn't build a small one, it had to be big by this design. Very hard to deliver, very expensive.

II Used a ~~X~~ great deal of tritium, which was very expensive. It had to be very big, as Coleman said, president of Harvard, it would take an ox cart to deliver the damn thing. So practically speaking, you could only have a few, you only

Teller's
plan

use it on big cities, and for a few big cities, and for a few big cities you could do the job without ^{atom bombs, ~~you~~ didn't} ~~you~~ need this anyway. But they said it must be very clearly understood that this is not an atom bomb. All of these people who made an atom bomb know. This is not an atom bomb. This is a weapon of unlimited explosive power. The atom bomb is limited, practically speaking, ~~for~~ ^{to} about $\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of TNT equivalent, half a megaton. With ^{the} most modern techniques you could get it up to a megaton. ^(That's the amount we dropped on Vietnam each year for seven years.) This is unlimited, so we don't think you should do it. Robbie and ^{Terrie} ~~Phemie~~ wrote in a report, ^{a minority report...} ~~and~~ one of the things they said was: "This is necessarily an evil thing in its own right. It should not exist." We should not be the ones ^{to introduce} ~~who produce~~ it. This must be the report that Robbie is referring to. It was his last report. Why, by the way, and it's the only time I've ever seen the four letters, evil, in a government report. You remember that the dispute arose as to whether or not the words "that would be wrong" occur in the ^{Watergate} ~~Weatherby~~ Transcript. ^{Halderman} ~~Alderman~~ said they did, at the point when the suggestion was made to pay off Howard Hunt to keep him quiet about the entry into my psychiatrist's office. Halderman went to jail for perjury for having said, that because Nixon had not said that and it was not in the transcript. Those words do not occur in 7,000 pages of the Pentagon Papers, the words THAT WOULD BE WRONG - does not occur. That is taboo. When you say - you could find any word. That would be mistaken, that would be foolish, that would be reckless, that would be costly, that would be wasteful, that would be inappropriate. That would be a terrible error, even that would be catastrophic in the sense of error. ^{But} ~~The words~~ ^{saying that would be criminal,} or evil, or immoral is not to be found. I'll give you one reason for that. There are a number of reasons.

Q: Could you say that would be illegal?

D.E.: No. Not really. First of all because it's consciously understood that that's meaningless, ^{applied to} presidential decisions pre-Watergate. You had lawyers to make it legal. The lawyers come from Harvard and so that's their job to take care of the legalities. What ~~you~~ you could say is, our ~~opponents~~ opponents will charge that it is illegal. No problem. We'll go into court. We have a case to go into court. ^{I'll come back to that} Whatever it is. If - it was literally not thought to be a relevant category because what is illegal, ^{mean?} Nobody could ~~conceive~~ conceive of legal sanctions ^{being} brought to bear either against the president or anybody who served him, and that's what the people who went to prison undoubtedly thought of as ^{an} absolutely unforeseeable betrayal by the president. And by the way, that's why many people in the country believe that Gally had been betrayed and were basically sympathetic with him ~~because~~ - not because they really approved of what he had done, but because the government had broken a contract with him and with them, which was that if they obey their orders, whatever they are, they will not be charged with having done anything wrong. The responsibility will be taken by the superiors. The people who tried Gally and let everybody else off broke that contract. I heard person after person calling up - calling up stations during that period and they would say: "Jesus Christ, I saw things like that in Germany, or did things like ^{that}. It happens all the time. That's war time." But the fury and the sense of betrayal in their voice indicated, ~~that~~ ^{is} the government about now to take away my immunity on this and to say that it is my fault that I did this and not their fault. [?] I think that was ~~the~~ the key aspect in the reaction to Gally. This is my inference ^{as} to one reason why those words are taboo? If they are taboo, ^{you can say them, if it is part of your resignation letter, but you can't expect to stay in.} ^{It becomes a} ~~because of the~~ deeply ingrained reflex. You learn this. You would no more say it than you would say negro or girl at this table. One learns. I think the reason is - one major reason is that the word evil suggests a judgment which compels you do something about it and to do something ~~disobedient~~ ^{about it} ~~disobedient~~. If you really think it's not

just mistaken, but evil, you cannot collaborate ⁱⁿ it. You should expose it. You should leave it. You should tell the courts. You should tell somebody. You should do something, you should ~~do~~ put a spoke in it. There's not simply enough to say that it is a mistake. You cannot just write a memo about it if it is evil. Strickly speaking, you can, ^{because Fermi having} ~~Pharise~~ said that it was evil ^{when} the president once said: "Bullshit, we're going to do it," ^{Fermi signed up - as did} ~~all of~~ the others. Everyone cooperated with the program once the president decided. Having said basically, ^{that it was} ~~not~~ just a minor error, but it was going to end life on earth. You want to do it? OK. So in other words, even if you say evil, if you're a good bureaucrat it probably doesn't mean too much. It might... Robbie didn't. He was excluded from then on and he never along that course, ^{of weapons involvement} ~~any more~~ Some people drop out.

2- Extraction of all ^{emotion} ~~information~~ from these observations.

D.E.- If you read these documents they are fairly emotional.

Q- They can be emotional in a positive way, but not in a negative? They can't say this is terrible. It can't be done.

D.E. If you look at the Pentagon Papers. When you look at the thought that peoples' predictions that we were heading into a really bad course of action. ^{we were going to} Have many terrible consequences. You can't say that it is all entirely detached from emotional. You advise your president that he's definitely on a wrong course and if he says "that's it," That's it. I told you, I had my say. My day in court. ^{I was talking} ~~Talked~~ to Roger, but now I want to relate it to one thing. Positive and - I just read your book coming back from Germany ^{and} I would have to say that I revere this book. It's an amazing book. I really thought of it in these terms: I once asked myself - I think of ~~XXX~~ civilization as urban culture

five thousand years ago, maybe about 3 thousand B.C, as having led to the
sophistication in some people which permitted ^{then} to tear apart and ^{re-form} ~~reform~~ the atoms
in such a way as to doom ^{cities.} ~~sake~~. Creating a weapon which is essentially ^{a weapon} against
cities and it ^{will} ~~would~~ be used against cities, unless somehow we ^{find} ~~found~~ a way to
stop it. So I have a jaundiced view about technology at this point. I remember
once thinking of what kind of technology that I really ^{fully approve of?} ~~fully~~ I decided
that an underwater face mask that allows you to go under water and suddenly
discover an entire new universe. That's how I think of your book. Suddenly
like having a glass plate and you see an entire world ~~in~~ a complex, living,
organic world, ^{that was} simply blurred and invisible, ^{before.} Just marvelous. Let me relate
that to what I'm saying. It's a world of personal relationships and attitudes
toward personal relationships. If ^{one} ~~you~~ could extrapolate directly from behavior
in personal relationships and attitudes toward personal relationships, then
women couldn't have allowed this to happen, but actually they did allow ~~this~~ ^{it}
to happen. They haven't obstructed it at all. They haven't been part of it
in the ^{most} ~~direct~~ sense, which is suggested by ^{your} ~~the~~ book, and so it's compatible
with that, that women have not been available to either command or directly
take part in the preparation in massive slaughter, ^{of women & children.} In fact, if you break down
~~first~~ those categories of who thinks it's immoral, who thinks it's wrong,
women are going to be much more in that proportion ~~than~~ in that. In fact,
something invisible to women during the Vietnam War which I discovered, was
that women opposed the war every year of the war about 10% more than men did,
as did blacks by the way. This was also true of Korea, but not in the second
World War. There was no major sex or race difference in attitudes for the
second World War, but there was a sharp difference, ~~but~~ 10% or 15% throughout
Korea and Vietnam. These were both wars that women and blacks proportionately
felt that we didn't need to fight, compared to ~~XXXXXX~~ World War I^I. I can think
of various reasons for that. Almost no women knew that, ~~and~~ ⁱⁿ fact I mentioned
it to Gloria Stein ^{man} before she brought out Ms. She asked me to write an article

on this and I was one of two men in the first issue of Ms. Two token men.

~~See~~ ^{my} article was on 'women don't seem to ^{notice} ~~know this~~ and why don't they don't they do something about it? But they never did particularly, during the war. They had other issues that ^{had} high priority, as did the blacks. They did not focus on the war. They were not aware that there was this much difference.

Now of course we know we have the greatest sex difference and attitudes toward a president that has ever been recorded, and it's on the war/peace issue, not just on abortion - but on war and peace. So we have this difference as ^{would be} suggested by your book. But, conjecture... First a piece of data. From the ^{Milgram} expense, hypothetical, to me very convincing, as well as compatible with my direct

experience.) The Milgram expense doesn't show women behaving differently any more than Germans do, in fact less statistical difference between men and women in their behavior. He finds, as would be suggested by your book, ~~MYHIXX~~ a significance in their attitudes. Many men are anguished by the experience, ^{that} more women are anguished and they cry and say I won't go on, I won't do it; but like the men, they do it when told they must do it. Conjecture:

Very few books that I've seen on ethics (and now as you know since Vietnam, ~~there~~ ^{courses in proliferation}) ~~is an~~ ethics proliferation. Very few books that I've seen on ethics address what seem to me the relevance ^{to sphere} ~~for~~ which is behavior within organizations.

Behavior of people at the top, ~~or~~ in the hierarchy, or at the bottom of organizations as opposed to personal relationships. That seems to me the danger area and the area that is going to kill us, ~~and~~ they don't address it. Conjecture: The difference ^{is} that you find in not only attitudes, but in behavior in personal ~~relationships~~ relationships between men and women, do not show up so prominently between the behavior between men and women in organizations. ^{hypothesis} That means, not good enough. How could this be change in the way of education. Let me give a

thought that occurred to me the other day. When it comes - I say that what is threatening survival of humanity right now, ^{I haven't given the evidence, but} (my other lectures deal with the following question entirely) what is threatening survival is the readiness of national leaders secretly, on the whole to regard slaughter as an available

instrument of national policy. By slaughter I mean massacre. The deliberate
annihilation of large numbers of unarmed, non-combatants, mostly women and children
and old men. Parenthetically, nuclear weapons are ^{essentially} only tools of massacre, ^{like} ~~Auschwitz~~ ^{Auschwitz}
there are some small exceptions to this, but leads so quickly to massacre ^{as to be nearly} a route
to massacre. ^{like an anti submarine weapon.} You don't use ~~any~~ ^{anti-} submarine weapons by themselves. Basically,
nuclear weapons are tools of indiscriminate destruction of defenseless people,
as is, ^{let's say, Auschwitz.} And to another degree, ^{strategic bombing in general} high-level bombing is such a tool.
The atom bomb was simply invented to do the work of high-level bombing more
efficiently. ^{And then the H-bomb.} The readiness to inflict massacre and the readiness of people
to obey it and to support it and to support the preparations is what is
leading us over the cliff. If you think of it as a crime, then what we are
watching is the preparation of a crime that has not yet been committed and
the question of responsibility is the question of responsibility with respect
to ongoing preparations to the greatest crime ever committed. Who can be
mobilized, who can be found to obstruct this in various ways? Let me conjecture
that it is not the people who are most in harmony with the purposes ^{with} the
preparations, ^{and} let me say, by the way, that it is not my perception that ~~it~~
anybody wants to massacre, they want the war to occur. They want, ~~to~~ however,
to use the threat of massacre, and in some circumstances they want to use
the massacre ^{But} instrumentally for other goals. ^{They don't just want to annihilate.}
I'm talking ^{now} about people who agree with the goals and the willingness to use
massacre as an instrument. Let me conjecture that we don't have time to change
their values. Most of them are men. Nearly all of them are men
It occurred to me just the other day ^{after having read your book that} if we wanted to re-educate them, the
emphasis should be on addressing those people who are already out of sympathy
with the preparations, with the risks that are being taken, but who aren't
doing much about it. The education that is needed is education for ^{being} disobedience,
for being resistant, for being obstructive and how to do it and that means most

women and many men, ^{and} it excludes most ~~XXXXX~~ men and some women. So it's education for learning to perceive that not something criminal is happening, ~~XXX~~ I think all women perceive that something criminal is happening, but what we should do when we see a crime is being committed, ^{and how to do it.} ~~and~~ that will take massive education. It seems to me that if you focus on the men, a lot of them we would have to train them both ways, to perceive it was wrong, and then to do something about it. Even if you convince them it was wrong, they're still the state that everybody else is, ^{They're} ~~and~~ unwilling to do anything. The women at least are half way there, ^{maybe.} So that's what your book suggested.

Many of the people in the movement feel this intuitively, without having seen why this might be the case, ^{that there really is a gender difference.} As you know ~~XXXXX~~ mostly feminist and feel very conflicted by their own intuition. They feel there is a difference, but they don't want to feel that. It goes against their own - but ... That's the point, how to educate people to let into their consciences, not ^{just} that something is wrong, but that something is wrong in a way that obligates them to act and to mobilize together. As a political issue I felt for a long time it was essential that organized women take this as an issue of organized women. That ^{now} and all other people could accept in addition to the ERA and so forth, and this priority. ^{And} of course when you talk to them - there is some tendency in that direction in the last year. Prior to that, they said, that's everybody's problem, ~~We~~ we have our own problems, we shouldn't solve ~~I~~ your problems. The real answer to that is: ^{Don't} wait for the men to solve this one, because they are on the wrong side, ^{So} if you don't solve it, you women, it isn't going to be solved. It does affect you and your children, ^{everybody else}

Q The question I asked at the beginning in the spirit of this conversation men are better at this. ^{than women:} Where you began to perceive something that went against ^{what was} going on around you. What led you to hold on to your own perceptions? ~~like not~~ ^{and} not ^{accept} to those around you who told you that what you were doing was automatically

not for the good of the world, but crazy and . Start to speak about I think there's a problem and what's going on. Talk is on the validity and veracity of those perceptions. How do you hold on to those?

D.E. My perception^s, then or now, perceptions on the war were always, if anything, respect^{ed}. On Vietnam I was perceived as an expert. I knew more about more aspects of the war. Nobody could say *I knew less* about the war by that time. Of course *I'd read the P.P. -* an expert..just to find that somebody would write a book that nobody had read. I had read the Pentagon Papers and nobody else read it. But my perception of this as something that called for, determined, if necessary, isolated, action and resistance. That ~~would seem~~ *was seen* as *defiant* to despite this complex ~~man~~ *mind*, simplistic, extremist, ~~naïve~~, childish. By the way, the word evil has come to mean to me,, there are lots of ways to define evil, although I discovered that there is no article on evil in the Encyclopedia Britanica, when I tried to see what people said about evil. There is an article about it in Micropedia. And there the problem of evil is the problems of Christians who want to understand God, theosophy problem, not a problem that something that happens ⁱⁿ the world, or something about them. Perhaps it's for this reason, ~~to~~ *define it, is* me evil, as I think Gandhi would ~~have found~~, what must be resisted, ~~what must~~ what one cannot be part of. One cannot ~~XXX~~ lie about it, one must tell the truth about it, one must expose it, one must resist it. That's precisely the meaning in which I think the word is regarded as a danger signal, if anyone were to use it in a bureaucracy. Because better way that's associated with the perception ^{*this person has been*} of born again, turned into idealogic, you can't tell what they'll do now. Get him out. They've become a nut. As a matter of fact, I was identified by George Bundy's deputy as a fanatic on the subject of nuclear weapons, and actually I can't resist the word fanatic. It's not a good word or a bad word as far as I'm concerned. I am kind of a fanatic *on me* But extremists, dogmatic, no I don't perceive these things at all, *about myself.* Someone

Def. of evil

who knows black and white. The projections that were made about me were interesting, for example. That I must be a person, ^{I tell about} (because what they think they're not.) Ellsberg ^{always} thinks that what he is doing is the right thing at the time, ^{he} but knows exactly what is right and wrong. He sees everything as black and white. ^{This is} As tounding because anybody who knew me, except ^{the people} a few, I'm on an opposite pole. My PhD thesis was on risk, ambiguity and decisions.

My honor thesis was on decision making under uncertainty. It will not surprise me in the least if I decide next week that everything I said today was wrong, and I'm quite aware of it at the moment, ^{that I'm saying things that are terrible}. So, I know that that's terribly wrong. So why then is there the necessity of seeing me in this particular mold? Well, because as I say, I'm not that way, I don't want to seek martyrdom, I don't want to seek publicity - reasons why they weren't doing what I had done. Publicity, ^I ~~the~~ spent fifteen years totally anonymous.

As Halperin said of a bureaucrat, bureaucrats do not sign what they write, and do not write what they sign. Totally anonymous, and I lived very happily in that. And all of a sudden, I become a ^{insane} publicity seeker? Not really. All these reasons why they shouldn't do it. You ask me ~~XXX~~ about me and I'll tell you one ingredient that was crucial. I had to meet someone, I said I had to, and I did and I find that most other people who ~~made~~ changes like this have, met someone face-to-face who was sufficiently like themselves that they could identify themselves and discern that this person was doing something, risky, self-sacrificing, for what seemed adequate reasons, with some hope of effectiveness.

I met someone from Harvard who was going to prison, who then immediately suggested, since he was a very reasonable, common sense, nice person, intelligent; Randall Kahler. This was something that had to be considered that might be worth doing. It was worth doing for him. That led me to ask myself the question ["] what could I do if I were willing to go to prison? Let me enlarge my options now, and perhaps I will discover, ["] when you do that you discover strength, freedom and powers that hadn't occurred to you before because they are simply ruled out from

consideration because they involved a risk to your career. It's not just because you're cowardly, but because it is thought of as wrong, inappropriate to consider things that risk your career. It is not expected ~~XXXX~~ of you, it's not desired of you, and indeed the person who seemed^s to be doing that would be perceived of as an fanatic, a nut of some kind who will not advance very much in a career. Really, to consider such things is to be a questionable person. So you ^{don't} usually think of ~~them~~^{it} and when somebody puts that into your head, you will then think of things you can do that you just hadn't thought of before. That's why I do civil disobedience now. It's precisely - I feel an obligation to pass along this suggestion to people ⁱⁿ and the only way that it can be done ^{which} is to show them someone doing it. You can't just talk about it, ^{though} Talking about it is helpful. I think, really, ^{the} that most common pattern for people who do make these changes is that they have heard about this idea at a certain point and thought ~~XX~~ about it a little and then have seen somebody who is doing it. I don't say the combination is necessary. I think the second ^{point} is almost necessary. It's extremely ^{common} ~~calm~~. Martin Luther King had read about Gandhi for years, he was a Gandhi student, scholar, which is unusual. You have ^{He} to hear about Gandhi from somebody. ~~XXX~~ went to a lecture and learned about Gandhi and went out and read about Gandhi and reflected on it a great deal, and then he went to Montgomery, Alabama and it was put to him that he should support Rosa Parks the day she went to jail by organizing a boycott. His first reaction was, "Oh, my God I just got back here, I'm trying to be in this community where (his) father had a church." It was the last thing he wanted to do, ~~was~~ to be a trouble maker. And then he said, "this is what he was writing about. He says 'I realized that the meaning of Gandhi's words (which he had read three years by now,)' 'to collaborate, to be silent about evil, is to be an accomplice to it.'" I should do this. This is exactly what had happened. I had read about Gandhi, I read about King, and I thought about this a lot and then I met Randall ^{Kehler and realized -} ~~Peter~~ - it can be done. This is the way we do it. So I say I take ~~pride in a~~

~~lot of reading~~

part in a lot of

low-level action^s, doesn't involve very much.

I have spent a month or two in jail. But
Never been sent to jail, or ~~desert island~~. We're talking about the
practical risks, the likely risk are a few days in jail, being arraigned^{ed}
and maybe six months probation. But it conveys the notion that you can
step ~~outside the~~ ^{constraints} ~~restraints~~ of decency, ^{and respectability.} and survive. Life will go on
and that's what you can threaten the good opinions of your neighbors.

Risk the good opinion. You may not lose it, but you risk it. ~~THE~~ And be
effective by doing so. ^{And when} People say to me, well, you knew you could be very
effective, ^{he called} you had the Pentagon Papers and - on the other hand you were risking
115 years. ^{That is} ~~There is~~ a different category. ~~There are only two ways.~~ First of
all, that's not true of these other people. By the time I put out the Pentagon
Papers in '71, Nixon had fully committed himself to the war, ^{The} the Pentagon Papers
dealt with events up to '68, they didn't deal with Nixon. He could have
brushed them aside as saying, that involved the Democrats, it doesn't involve
me. It was his own personal instinct to do that. The war would have gone on
had he done that. Erichman advised him to do that. Kissinger, for other
reasons, advised him to go after me. But he could have ~~XXXX~~ done that, and I
knew perfectly well, ^{he could have done that.} I had no reason to believe that the Pentagon Papers had
any high likelihood of doing anything at all. A month before the Pentagon Papers
came out, in May, I sat with four Cambridge professors on 14th Street in
Washington. ^{Known's} I was some risk of demeaning myself if the Pentagon Papers
came out a month from now, ^{maybe} detract from the politics of it. I was doing it
because I thought sitting on 14th Street was about as likely to have a good
effect as putting out the Pentagon Papers. The day after that ^{the} ~~people~~ ^{were} ~~Norman~~
^{Chomsky} ~~Chomsky~~, Howard Zin, Mark Potashy and Marilyn Young, all professors, ^{Two}
days after ^{that,} we sat in front of the federal building and got beat up. Howard
got badly beaten and I got very badly beaten - smashed my watch ^{with a 4 foot club} (kept working -
crystal was smashed and kept working). I actually went with bandaged wrists
to the last faculty seminar that I've ever been invited to till this week,
which is the Harvard/MIT Seminar which I addressed a couple of times and this

occasion was hearing from Herman Kahn ^{on how to win the} war in Vietnam. That was two weeks before the Pentagon Papers came out. ^{I'm saying that} I really thought in front of the federal building was about significant as the Pentagon Papers, but it seemed worth doing. I had to do what I could. I would not ^{have} put out the Pentagon Papers had it not been for Randy ~~Taylor~~ ^{KEELER} and certain others who had nothing to work with but their own lives. Put their bodies in jail. So by their doing that, they gave me the idea to put out the Pentagon Papers, which, it turned out, did have an effect. They were in fact part of that ^{causal} chain and that's true of any act of civil disobedience. Two Livermore scientists had ^{in the last few months} resigned. ^{return} Just mention one thing about disobedience. I've been part of a program to sever the connection between ^{U.C.} ~~the~~ and the ^{weapons} labs which actually started very small - ^a pretty good action, it turned out, ~~Educationally~~. Governor Brown ended up joining and appointing regents who would vote... Big issue. Started with just a handful of undergraduates. But I was interested to learn that the ^{ferment at} ~~farm in~~ Livermore, which now exists, 40 miles from Berkeley, did not begin in the slightest degree until our first act of civil disobedience at the gates of Livermore. Three years of agitation, which had brought us in front of the regents, ^{several times} which is well recorded in the San Francisco papers, ^{they} were totally oblivious to it at Livermore. They didn't even know. The first time they understood that some people questioned whether they should be doing what they were doing is when they had to step over our bodies last February. ^{Then a bigger action.} The result has been constant talk about it and two people have actually resigned their jobs and joined the movement, and ^{the} ~~be~~ head of public relations. Converted. I was his job. He used to look at vidfos of me. This is the enemy. ^{Listen to him} What are the arguments. He was basically turned around by Helen ^{Caldicott} and then followed by the action, and then he resigned. \$75,000 a year job, to which he come from being head of public relations for IBM. This guy is a big wheel. ^{He is} Now ~~is~~ one of our major spokesmen. ^{for the Freeze.} He's the one who told me that they didn't have a problem at Livermore until the civil disobedience. ^{Just one more confirmation of the difference that} Each ~~truth~~ like that comes with the ^{such recruit} authority, comes with the data, ^{with the audience} Enormous improvement. Could lead me to focus

my efforts entirely on recruiting such people. Actually the odds are not
You don't get very many, and it's not enough
too great. So I do that a little bit. But mostly you have to work with
~~XXXX~~ people who aren't in that system.

Do you think people were

Wrong on the sentencing also? You said that people were wrong on two
counts — *they pointed out to you that* you had this power...
you had this power...

Thought I had a lot of power. Of course they were right about that. The point
there is — the people who converted me to this possibility were not facing that
long a sentence. *long enough.* Two years in prison is it. *From all my friends in prison:* Three months ^{is} very interesting.
Six months still very educational. One year is long enough and anything
over that is very, very draggy. Two years is long. Everything is the same,
you've done it all before. *you get* Very, very tired *of it.* Two years is a basic sentence.
Some of them served three years.

Q: How long was Randy in?

He was two years. Incidentally the perception that people who do this are
people who only want to be martyr. Randy ~~Taylor~~ ^{Kehler} got out of prison, moved
back to his home town in Massachusetts, and then ^{they} made the mistake of trying
to build a nuclear reactor across the road from him. So, he began organizing
on that issue, and then had the idea simultaneously ^{with} Randy Foresberg (independently,
they did not know each other), he read the Sojourners Piece suggesting
the freeze. He decided to put on the ballot in western Massachusetts ^{a referendum} for the
freeze to run in 1980. ^{in 3 counties in western Massachusetts.} Couldn't get it on the news, and they weren't getting
any volunteers to put the petitions around, ^{so} and he asked to come out and see
what I could do. I came over, and in fact ~~it~~ did get on the evening news ^{for several}
I spoke to a lot of colleges and urged people to — ^{all} most all of their recruits
^{for} were getting ^{it} on the ballots, he tells me, came from my college ^{lectures} people signed

up. So ^{that} we got it on the ballot. Three counties in western Massachusetts.
^{for Reagan, and all three went}
All three ~~went~~ for the freeze. ^{and} that showed that you didn't have to be

^{against Reagan} to be against the arms race, ^{and} that led to the idea by Joe Seivita

and a woman Josephine and her husband. They heard of the western Mass.

and ^{said} let's get it for the ballot in Calif. in '82. But they didn't have any
money, so they talked to the ⁱⁿ Unitarian Church, ^{which was a converted residential house.} and they decided to use the \$1,200

that they had raised to put ^{a new roof on} into the leaking roof for the church into recruiting
^{for petitioners} people for freeze. ^{They successfully argued,} "If we don't get a freeze, we won't need a new roof."

Then they went out and hired Harold Willis who put his own money in it.
^{And that's the start of the California freeze.}

That came directly from Randy Kehler, who is now the national coordinator

for the freeze. So these things are ^{a web} ~~read~~ and certainly ^{women} are very, very

involved in it. But essentially they join ^{as an} ~~as an~~ individual? Womens' organizations

have not seen it as a women's issue. I think it is a ~~men's~~ women's issue because

it is the issue of those females ^{and} men who have not ^{exposed all that} ~~exposed~~ ^{femaleness from them}.

To act, keep the ^{web} going. I've been doing a lot of talking, and I would
be happy to hear any constructive suggestions as to how to do this.

A couple of questions. Primarily ^{moral} psychology.

I've
Studied people who did quit.

~~DE:~~ I was asked by Cronkite when I was underground, the FBI was searching for me.

By the way, my places of hiding were mostly organized by people in the Education
^{because of a member of the Education school, a Gandhian woman who said all}
School. He asked me "Do you seem to find Cronkite, a very depressing, ^{said} ~~dismaying~~ ^{that}
story ^{of} the lies. Do you see any heroes?"

(Cannot hear this speaker at all).

Conventional ^{moral} judgment in some sense, ^{well defined} morality.

Maintain ...

END OF TAPE 1

Elisabeth D. School of Education 3/1/83
Newark
(Faculty Seminar)

(Audience)

They wouldn't ^{bother} with him and he wouldn't ^{bother} with them. Then he said that he had heard Cally and McGuy talking ^{about it} the evening before the massacre had occurred. ^{As a sergeant, I guess he was} The only one of the enlisted men ^{privy to that} And so I said, "did you have any - did you see yourself as having any responsibility to try to stop it and not personally participate in it?" He said look, ^{at the time I didn't} he said, ~~I don't~~ know I'd like to know what the whole situation ^{was} ~~is~~. ~~THEYXX~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ Tell them that if they went ahead with the plan, ^{he'd report it when} ~~went~~ they got back to Saigon. He said "you know what would have happened to me, I would have been shot in the back, ^{and so on. But} I was just making a ^{distinction} between the capacity for the moral judgment in the first place and ^{then} varying degrees of ^{moral} courage ~~and~~ in ^{actually carrying it out} it naturally ~~turned out~~ That's the kind of thing you were talking about - ^{in your} ^{having had to have the} ~~having~~ moral courage to take the risks that were involved as well as making judgments.

^{from} ~~the~~ Milgram situation, one of the conclusions we come to is that the people ^{who} ^{at this} were more advanced level of moral judgment - ^{defined} ~~could find~~ responsibility, ^{differently than less developed subjects.} ~~That when the experimenters said~~ the subjects would ^{after all} ^{is going to} ~~organize~~ who would take responsibility if something happens to this man with this electric shock.?" The experimenter said ^{I'll} ^{take} ~~the~~ responsibility, I'm in charge of this experiment." That would reassure certain subjects ^{who} would then go ahead, whereas we are ^{obviously} ~~obviously~~ as Milgram reports, ^{in his book, who would say:} "You can't say that. I've got the responsibility, you can't take the responsibility away from me. I have ^{to face} the responsibility of shocking this man no matter what you say, ^{and} That seems to have been a bridge between the way they made their moral judgments and their action in the ^{particular} ^{I would hope to} ~~situation.~~ Be able to talk with you sometime about ^{moral} psychology. But the central issue is about the nuclear movement and how you deal with the mutual deterrent argument, ~~The~~ argument that in fact since World War II there has been a balance of deterrence between the Soviet ^{Union} and America ^{that} and somehow that balance ^{has worked, and} ~~is there~~ unilateral disarmament ^{will} ~~was simply~~ destroy that balance and ~~make~~ the likelihood of unilateral

attack by the Soviet^{Union}, more likely. How do you answer that?

D.E.: Well, I'm not aware of anybody at the moment proposing total unilateral disarmament. I don't say anyone. I do know ^I could name some people. But the minority, ^{who} life-long pacifists, are like one in a million, ^{two in a million,} people in the movement. I might ask. I could ask you - ^{let} me ask you, why do you even pose the question to me that way? Since you haven't ^{heard} anybody advocate unilateral disarmament?

Q- It's what bothers me, that's what.

D.E. ^{Since} The movement is not calling ^{for} total unilateral disarmament.

Q: I guess, what is - the movement is not going to be unilateral disarmament, but ~~what~~ - it does seem to be based on the assumption that step-down expansion of nuclear weapons...

D.E.: The freeze movement is calling for a bilateral halt of ^{any} additions. Strictly speaking, the ^{freeze} ~~freeze~~ movement has not ^{yet} identified any measures of disarmament, even bilateral. This is what we're talking about ^{a movement that has the} support of 70% of the American people. On the other hand, it doesn't have the support of 30% of the people, which includes a lot of ^{elites and R. Reagan} ~~the~~ ^{leaders}. That's the immediate dividing line between the people.

Q That is ^{indeed} ~~the~~ the argument I put forward - is presumably the argument that ^{these} ~~the~~ elites ¹ would give.

(I don't want to project this on you, necessarily)

D.E. What I hear the elites doing ^{quite} is as they put it, stigmatizing or politically undermining a movement by ~~XXXX~~ explicitly and deliberately ^{and systematically} misrepresenting it in a most ^{gross} way. The fact is that Bush and Reagan miss no opportunity to ^{describe} ~~spot~~ "The Freeze" not some vague, ^{unspecified} movement, but the freeze movement ^{as a movement for} ~~for~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

unilateral disarmament. That is ^{very} simply a total misrepresentation and a very clearly motivated one. So it's true, they do ~~they~~ say that. They're asking the question - the question is meant deceive as a question. It is meant to deceive as a question, it's meant to deceive people as to what the actual ^{aim of the} movement is.

Q: Do you have a sense of what - if it isn't this fear - what it really is ^{that propels} ~~for~~ the ^{30%} of the population, the elite....

D.E.: I think that what Reagan and Bush and a lot of other people quite sincerely ^{as national commanders, leaders,} believe, is that movement proposes to disarm them of a kind of capability which they believe quite sincerely is indispensable to the protection of America and the achievement of American ideals and goals. But that ability is not an ability to deter a Soviet surprise attack on the United States. That's not ~~is~~ the problem. Nothing the Freeze is proposing, or in its wildest dreams proposes, would in any way lower our ability to deter or retaliate to a Soviet surprise attack. What they are worried about is being disarmed ^{of} the ability, plausibly, ^{credibly and} effectively to threaten to initiate nuclear war on a local basis. This they can't say ^{publicly because it} ~~publicly~~ and would not be popular if they did. So they pretend, quite dishonestly, but for idealistic reasons, that what these people are proposing to do is to take away the ability to respond to, ~~is~~ to deter, a nuclear attack, ^{when} ~~the~~ weapons they are buying, in fact not only don't deter attack, they invite attack. That's a cost of what they are meant to do. What they are meant to do is to threaten attack, and by threatening attack they have a regrettable feature ^{or cost} of somewhat ~~increasing~~ ^{increasing} the likelihood that the Soviets might, in that state of fear ^{and} crisis, be led actually to attack us. In the guise of strengthening our ability to deter an attack, they are proposing measures to be paid for by the taxpayers, that would in fact increase the likelihood of being attacked, ^{because} ~~they~~ feel they need those weapons for quite different reasons

which they can't admit. ^{Se} The reasons are that we must be able to threaten to initiate massacre. To initiate massacre. The other question you asked, which I'm not dismissing... right
^ You were certainly in saying this is the question that will be in the mind of the member^s of the public. I want to suggest that it is there because it is put there, ^{in the mind of the public} ^{issue} In fact not the revelent question to ask.
_(it is)

Q What proportion of the freeze movement would you say is actually in favor of ~~the~~ unilateral freeze?

D.E. - ^{of a} ~~The~~ unilateral freeze, as opposed to unilateral disarmament? Oh, quite large. ~~XXXXXX~~ I wouldn't say a majority, but ^a significant minority, probably 20 to 30%. There again, there is a deceptive aspect. When they think of ~~the~~ ^a unilateral freeze, they don't think of what the opponent will ~~hear~~ ^{hear} when he heard that. An opponent who heard unilateral freeze, would hear a permanent, total freeze no matter what the Soviets did, and they would immediately think well, what if the Soviets then went on for the next ten years building anti-balistic missiles and civil defense? That's what they hear. "Are you people for that?" Well, you people are not for that. They haven't thought in those terms. The people who do propose a unilateral measure, whether it is a a freeze or even disarmament, are thinking of it in tentative terms as a process in the hopes that it would be reciprocated, and with, I think the tacit assumption - if it were ^{it} reciprocated here's what I would say: There is no practical - even if one ~~XXXXXX~~ ^{possibility} regards a halt to the arms race as a practical possibility, as I do. That's ^{being} pretty optimistic. That's having a wide range in [?] values.

Q Counting on us women.

D.E. ^{But} Even I am not prepared to think about the possibility of what's ^{postulated} there, of unilateral reductions on our part, or even a halt, while the Soviets go on ^{unimpeded} for ten years. Forget it. I'm not going to work for a minute on that possibility.

I don't even want to talk about it. I'll even say to the ^{Berrigans} who want to talk about unilateral ^(friends of mine — they are in this tiny minority) who want to talk about total unilateral disarmament. "If you're trying to make some ^{kind of} point about values ^{or witness or morality} by talking about such a hypothetical thing, it's like talking about unicorns, forget it.

^{That} ~~It~~ is not a possibility for the United States ~~XX~~ or even any other state.

It's "Outside the realm of reason or useful discourse about politics." But what is possible, but what is barely possible and is important, is the possibility of a unilateral step of some kind. ^{An initiative.} What I'm talking about right now at the highest priority is this: that the U.S. must (and I'll use the ~~XXXX~~ dread word unilaterally,) stop the testing of ^{Pershing} ~~Persean~~ missiles before those things get fully tested and deployed. We are five years ahead of the Russians on it, and if we keep on testing and deploy them, there will not be a Freeze, because the Russians will not be wise enough to accept a Freeze after we have a Pershing and they don't have it. So we've got to stop it. If we were together on the process, as most ^(at the same point) Freeze people think we are ^{wrongly}, then we don't have to focus on that because wherever, anytime we get a freeze, we stop, and we both stop together and it's over. The trouble is that we are ahead and if we keep going ~~and~~ being ahead, the Freeze will pass a threshold where the Freeze will become impossible. ^{So} I think it's essential that this be stopped. Reagan won't stop it. It must be stopped against his wishes. That can be done because that's how the Bombing of Vietnam was stopped against Nixon's wishes ^{and Ford's wishes.} If can be done with enough pressure. That's why we're going to Washington next week to ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ encourage people to do just that, and it can be done. The biggest chunk of people that make - actually, with the Catholics joining this movement ^{in a big way in} ~~in February and~~ May, I think the odds changed from less ^{than even} to better than ^{even} ~~odd~~. I think we've accomplished

As high as that?

Oh, with the Catholics, because it's not just numbers of course. They are organized. ^{and they are a hierarchy.} There will be, a lot of people will discover disobedience to their

bishops in a way which they earlier discovered on birth control. Now another
step they'll discover. A lot of others will still carry out orders. ^{So that's big.} The other
one will be unions. That's not going to happen. It might happen through the
Catholics. That's my secret, ^{nope.} The Catholic church led the unions into the
cold war, they could lead them out of the cold war. I came to Harvard to be
a labor economist. I joined the UAW when I was 17. ^{But} While I was at Harvard
studying with Dunlop and ^{Schlechter}, the Catholic church cooperated with
Truman in purging the left-wing leaderships of all the unions and replacing them
with good, Catholic obedient cold warriors. ^A Very specific watershed in
American politics. The Catholic could reverse that. The other thing is women.
The block that has to remove this is women

The
feeling has always struck me about ~~birth~~ Bernhart

Talk about ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Bernhart.

Q - Bernhart was in the Army. He learned the Vietnamese language and culture as
part of his training in the Army. And so when he arrived there, he knew the language
and culture of those people, and so he was unable to distance himself in the way
~~that~~ I think would allow one to ^{stigmatize and then} shoot them. That's seems to me a different dimension.
The obedience to authority is one dimension, where ^{do} you place yourself in
relationship to

D.E. - with ^{there is a} Bernhart clear relation in this sense. ^{I was talking w/ Mack about it the other day, without mentioning Bernhart} Mack believes for instance, that
this kind of courage requires a sense of ^{high} loyalty, ^{of a} ~~than the~~ cause, ^{that} you're
serving. Bernhart had an ideal of the Army which he had joined as a volunteer.
He wanted to a regular. Bernhart said, what soldiers do and what soldiers don't
do ~~and that~~ conflicted with these commands. So they totally ^{his sense was not} - this is what
I joined the army to do, and this is not what the army should do. - Whatever these
guys say. I had, for example ^{comparable...} - I know that feeling, because I had it ~~about~~
about the Marines - for example,

when I saw the movie "Coming Home" - I don't know how many people in the audience identified as I did with Donald Sutherland, the Marine ^{the company commander} who goes crazy in the course of the film at the thought of what his Marines had been led to do in Vietnam. The Marine Corps was ruined by this, depraved, corrupted by this. I know that exactly as a Marine. The Marines fought in the islands, they fought against Japanese. There were no civilians. There were a few, but almost none. Fought ^{gladiatorial} as a pure duel, ^{combat} in the islands, and Marine are not trained, they are shock troops. They're trained to stand up and walk into machine-gun fire. Marines are trained, by the way, for a very unusual military operation. They are trained to move across a kind of terrain that has no cover, mainly waste-deep water. There are no trees, there are no stones. You walk in to highly prepared cross-fire that the Japanese had spent ten or fifteen years preparing to cover every inch of that with machine gun and shell fire, so there was no gaps in it. ^{You were} Trained to get out of the boat and walk through that, into it. That's one thing, but burning down villages? Rounding up civilians? That's not what Marines are trained to do, but that's what they were led to do. This guy commits suicide in the end, and I identified with him in the movie.

④ ~~XXXXXXXX~~ of Vets dedication
On the day the Vietnamese Memorial in Washington, I happened to see Westmoreland walking around the edges in civies and with a little badge saying "Vietnam Vet" and it occurred to me to wonder: "do you know anything about his feelings? Does he have any of that feelings, of 'what did I make the Army do?'"

D.E. - I've met him a number of times. What did he make the army do? It's an interesting question. Of course the General is so removed ~~to~~ from the realities to a certain degree. ^{It's a} A little detached. ^[Q. - You don't think he'd be anguishing?] He didn't feel - I believe the day that ~~Milei~~ occurred, the unit that did it ^{got} ~~just~~ personal commendation ^{on the} ~~and~~ cables and the dispatches from Westmoreland for the high body count. It was the highest body count in Vietnam. ~~XXXXXX~~

MBG - That's what we measure merit by.

D.E. - So, you want to know - did Westmoreland know who those bodies were? Not certainly, but probably. Probably yes, I think Westmoreland ^{actually} did know that that massacre had occurred. There's no question that generals knew it and he might not have, you can't be sure. ^{But he} Probably did. ^{It} Had to be done." You know, I hate to say it, but he is an Army man, which means simply there are more generals, in a certain sense, they have to do a great variety of jobs. Being a good army man can mean all kinds of things, military, government, field sanitation, artillery, engineers. The idea is that ~~he had~~ ^{you have all this} a great variety of jobs to do, and whatever the job ^{is} was you do that job. So if the job requires ^{occasionally} this kind of massacre, ^{with great reluctance you can even accommodate that.} Marines are trained - part of their (clan?) is to say we have a very simple few little jobs to do. Only you are ^{capable of} doing ~~it~~ ^{that} and that's your pride. So the idea of stepping outside that - you're likely to be a little more critical. Is this a job for a Marine?

You know, I'm suppose to deliver you after lunch to BU, so maybe we should go have lunch.

This is absolutely new for me, faculty seminars. As I say, no faculty had ever invited me to a seminar until 1971.

Since Halderman broke into the .

D.E. I haven't had a ~~FOX~~ meeting like this or the one that I had yesterday since June of 1971.

MBG - I know it's true, but I can't believe it.

Q - Do you go on that campus lecture circuit that Halde~~man~~ and ^{Erl}ichman travel?

D.E. Sort of, yes. Of course I get a lot of ^{requests} ~~press~~ directly. Most of my lectures are done for the movement, ^{basically} but I also get income lectures.

Teaching

No, I haven't been asked to be teacher, until - got an offer this last fall. First time. Magazine they had ^{you} ~~me~~ listed as professor, ^{of political science at} I did teach at ^{Berkely} Stanford, but that was a students' ^{sponsored} ~~function~~ course. ^{D.E.}

Q I thought your point about the University as the site where all the weapons have been built is an extremely important point.

Something that is very

~~I ^{secret} ~~secret~~~~ ^{few} ~~most~~ ~~XXXXX~~ people knew.

And the government is hard to regulate,

How would you suppose

D.E. Support for the war measured by statements, do you think we should expand,

^{should we} ~~to XXXX~~ get out, ^{is the war} immoral, are you a hawk or a dove, were we ^{right} ~~had~~ to get in,

questions like that. The answers to those are ^{highly correlated, needless to say.}

How would you suppose the answers ^{are} correlated with education? Grade school only, high school, college? What would you think?

Q Complicated.

Q - That doesn't mean education, statistically correlated.

D.E. - How do you think it correlated?

Q - Negatively. Curvilinear

D.E. - Take three categories. Grade school only, High School or college.

Q - You know how I would like to see it come out. ^{the grade school} ^{educated} ^{of the ideology}
should have their judgment undivided by a lot of ^{they should be against the war. They are seeing....}
the grade school.

D.E. - You're wrong in ^{the way that} ~~XX~~ ~~very~~ essentially. Everybody is wrong. Politicians, everybody
else. ^{In} ~~and~~ every year of the war there was a strong, positive correlation
in education ^{and} ~~for~~ support for the war.

Q - That's what I was saying. That the grade school education was the most anti-war.
Margaret called me an idealist.

^{I didn't} ~~You~~ think it would be that clear a correlation.

D.E. - ^{It} ^{somewhat} Got mixed final years of the war. In '72 and '73.

Q - Most amazing thing. ^{Do you know what my prediction} ^{What position} is based on? I interview girls ^{and women} Eleven year old
girls ~~who~~ are tremendously self confident about all the values that I write about.
As they get into High School and College they lose confidence in that basis.

D.E. - If you had any data, you ~~couldn't~~ ^{couldn't} miss this because ^{there is} ~~XX~~ you're bound to get it right
because the data is so clear, ^{there is} not a lot of interpretation. The fact is that what
you learn in college ~~XXXXX~~ is 17 good reasons why the country has to kill people

for national interests and ~~impress~~ ^{to trust our leaders to decide}
when those occasions are.

Q- The whole frame of thinking in which that seems to make sense. ^{just read} I ~~did~~ a ~~XX~~
paper for child development and somebody finds that as children older, (this
is in name of ^{what they} development,) they fail to distinguish between ^{doing}
~~harm to persons & harm to property~~ ^{harm to persons & harm to property} ~~of property~~. They are seeing

This is not even picked up by the author

I was ^{called} ~~told~~ yesterday by somebody who ^{wants me to support the} Trident, ^{who did sabotage}
on the submarine. I have a strong tactical disagreement with the ^{Berrigans}
I believe that sabotage and damage to property is ^{the} politically wrong ^{way to go} for a lot
of different reasons. ^{To the extent that} I really don't want to be a witness for them, although
I know the people to some extent are good people, ^{and} I hate to stand aside from ^{them}
and I hate to be perceived as being ^{simply prudent} but I really disagree with them.

Part of the reason I was just thinking of saying to them, should I ~~XXX~~ finally
come out and say to Phil Berragan, I think ^{people perceive} damage to property
as violence.

They don't.

That's moderate.

The next to the last statement is

This paper called, Moral and ~~Behavioral~~ [?] rules. In contrast for children in the
younger age ^{group, a} from a prespective - in contrast
for children in the younger age ~~for~~ violation of the rule involving physical
harm to others was more wrong than a violation of the rules ^{involving} of property loss.
These findings suggest ^{that in} their moral judgments older children are better able
to coordinate consequences and the regulation of social interaction.

That's fantastic. Who wrote this?

I don't know.

Q It's an anonymous. It's a PHD. It's a Journal Article and I wrote a review saying that that's fascinating, but not from the perspective that they are saying it

notice why it's fascinating.

Notice how those two sentences go.

I somewhat
Disagree with

sense of ... civil disobedience

MBG This whole thing is - it hangs together at such a pattern. Following ^{him around} ~~reads~~ the Dept. of Economics, Psychiatry, the law School, History. Suddenly you see how it all hangs together.

D.E. But they say - ~~that~~ ^{we} are making the point that ^{damaging} property has nothing to do w/damaging people. And I say.
People don't see it that way.

They see it as
^ Compromising, morally comprising.

So you are making
^ Message is that those people are asking for it. They are being as violent as the government is.

? As a matter fact, are we sitting in front of the Sperry Corp. last week.

The Corporate Executive says you know you're being as violent as you're saying we are.

MBG I said: I'm just sitting here. You know what he said. You know how you're being violent? You are interfering with my freedom to run this business. And I said: well, if you call that violence, yes.

D.E. That's fascinating. When I was underground there was a interview - a piece on me in ^{my} ~~life~~ ^{me} ~~writing~~. They didn't interview ^{me} so they got papers from my father. In '71. The FBI was hunting me. The headline of the article "From hawk to violent dove."

Q- You broke a rule.

That's right. An extremist

There is a lot of ambiguity to the word "violence."

D.E. Ordinary violence is not all that different ~~from~~ but you run into paradoxical ^{cases where} ~~things~~. It turns out that the word violence applied to acts of disobedience or disrespect for authority.

I would think that would be the tendency ~~to say you're~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ to say you're doing exactly what you are accusing ^{them} of.

"There was a violent demonstration," they will say, where 100% of violence is by the police. The demonstration evoked "violent feelings" that's what I'm ^{At a demonstration I was part of the} not against. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Demonstrations evoke violent fears. federal building, we literally just sat there. Was called a violent demonstration.

When was that?

May 5th. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ They were furious at Howard.

Why? You understand that?

Because David Horowitz, first they knew ~~XX~~ him - he had lectured at police academy. Came up to us while we were sitting and said, very good lecture. But above all, the day before ^{he had given} ~~gave~~ a marvelous speech which he had singled out { I think, I can only infer } - what he asked for - now I want to address the undercover ~~interest~~ ^{agent}

ⁱⁿ
~~of~~ this crowd - about 20,000 people. You are acting as secret police.
You should not be doing that in this country

MBB- I don't associate that with Howard. I've never heard him talk to a large crowd.

D.E. - He said - it was two days after ^{Mayday.} he said "I was just in Washington where ~~the~~ George Washington and Thomas Jefferson and ^{Alexander} Hamilton ^{had been} walking yesterday, down the streets in Georgetown they would have been arrested for being young and having long hair.

Do you have the figures on education ^{the war in} Vietnam.

D.E. ^{I have a great mess}
^I gave them studies. There is a guy here who tipped me Sociologist named ... a son of a famous economist - Mota Yari

He's in Baltimore. Husband of Ann Tyler?

Reading ^{list} this I then followed up all the references.

I gave it to Fred Harris ^{when he} was running for President.

I asked him the same question. "e said the poorly educated will be hawks, for the war.
Chauvinists, rednecks ~~is~~ for the war.

I said you don't know who your constituency is. You don't know whose votes

your running for. You better read this stuff. So I gave him this whole pile

He used it; referred to it a lot.

^{is} another guy who summarized a lot of this was a guy named Charles Hamilton. Sustaining ^{Myth} ~~XXXX~~. The idea ^{is} ~~that~~ myths that sustain the order of things as they are.

Usual myth that people become more liberal, as they get more educated.

In general ^{all kinds of studies} show there is a relation to college education and liberal whatever.

For example the sex difference.

As you educate women you educate them into a way of thinking, ^{so} They are more like men. The interesting thing is that you get ^{this} dual response from them.

I use to get this response

. "Do you ~~KNOW~~ want to know what

I think, or do you want to know what I really think?" That was what ^{I think would be} the educators' response and ^{There was} what really feel is the other response. ^{Sense of dual} perception.

D.E. - what about my conjecture, then, that the difference between the Sex will not be so marked when you look at organization ?

that's what I think, because ^{people trained} get ~~chained~~ into a public language and that's what fascinates me. It really is a language. ^{that obscures}

They learn to label things in a way....

I caught your comment about absense of moral language.

nb6 - card, It's deeper than labelling. They learn to think that way. It's a mode of thought, it's not ^{simply} ~~strictly~~ a labeling.

Card I think that's ^{thrust} ~~where~~ the ~~quest~~ of my questions to you, Dan I think they see a double image.

I was in Chicago in 1960 ^{'s} and there was this Museum of Science and History there. ^{There was this huge missile and a} Big sign saying "Aerospace: power for peace" and you look at the missile.

D.E. - The labels express what¹⁶ they believe.

Card - ^{But then} Person comes along and says this looks like war to me.

Well, we ^{really get} ~~to~~ ~~been~~ into

// where
the fear of punishment

D.E. - and retaliation by the father to the little boy... Would he perceive ~~not so~~ ~~as the father~~ not so much ^a stimulated by the father's perception of the boy's ~~XXX~~ lust for the mother or the love for the mother, but as rather a punishment for and withdrawal of recognition ~~of~~ male appreciation, love, etc. by the father if the little boy is too much like his mother. Or, too much dependent on his mother.

Card - Interesting. The other thing - I think it's another way of saying the Oedipal story starts with the abandonment of Oedipus by ~~his~~ his father, and that suggests that this whole drama ~~and~~ begins with the father's abandonment of the child.

It's amazing is the degree to which Freud misses the element of ~~a~~ betrayal.

~~Paternal~~ ~~Internal~~ betrayal.... in those stories

But ^{Paternal} ~~ends up~~ just walking away from the child ~~and~~ setting up the whole process which makes the child..

MPG - Eric has written a whole paper on this on the nature of suicide, as about ~~against~~ ~~patricide~~ the Oedipus story - turning it right around in the International Journal of —

D.E. ^A ^{who} Guy, was kind of nutty, called Codrigan wrote a book called The Ordeal of Civility. ^{I see the} Book is essentially a simple anti-semitism. A simple Irish-Catholic anti-semitism. But he has an interesting ~~XX~~ observations here. He does have a chapter on Oedipus ~~XXXXXXXX~~ which is rather interesting and Freud's own relation to that. The relation of ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Freud's disillusionment ^{at} of his father ⁱⁿ and his father's wound? was to step into the street to remove his cap. when ^{a Jew} Knocks his cap off, and Freud's humiliation with his father.

And the Vietnam generation too - 17 -

↑ In Vietnam a lot of men felt betrayed by their fathers, sending them

D.E. I would say betrayed by their fathers and mothers.

Card ^{inaction a failure to act to stop it.}
The mothers by omission, ^{the} fathers by the participation. Equal betrayal.

MBG - You ~~will~~ know what happens in the wake of that betrayal? What happened is the self-help movement. Right through the whole Vietnam thing and into the 70s.

^{You're}
Betrayed by your parents - hey, wait a minute. The caretakers have left us; we'll have to help ourselves
It's like children abandoned in the war

D.E. ^{But} One of the things that is missing - I don't see in feminist writing much of a strain
(ⁱⁿ or writing ^{even} from a ^{female} point of view) is the element of competition between the little girl and her mother. For instance

MBG - It comes in adolescence a lot.

A woman said to me recently, & I'd never heard it before:
"Of course women feel rivalrous with their daughters." ^{I had} Never heard that said before.
Envious? Rivalrous

Do you have any reservations about ^{the Milgram stuff?} ~~the book~~ I found the ^{profession's} focus
^{the interest of that} on ~~that~~ experiment ^{of attention} is a classic example of displacement and turning away from
extremely disquieting evidence, ^{to a} much more comfortable ^{area} I thought it was ^{bizarre} ~~designed~~.
They just left the findings ^{behind} and they wanted to determine whether he should have come up with them.

I was at Yale at the time.
~~XXXXXX~~ at that point he was only ^{throwing them off by saying the guy} didn't want the rumor to get around.

He wasn't even telling them that it was a ^{staged} deep kind of moral

conflict. They were in, what they should have done, etc.

D.E. - There was only a fraction, I take it, only a minority fraction that felt a conflict.

Q - I think most of them felt a conflict.

My research was ^{when he was still doing it with} undergraduates and then I left Yale. I felt ethically, ambiguous. I argued that he shouldn't be doing the experiment, but went ahead and interviewed the subjects.

D.E. - ^{my feelings are} The findings in that case are so astounding. that I will take them and use them, however they were arrived at.

MBG - Dan, I ~~think~~ think you're right, it was a defensive action on the part of academic critics. ^{To} focus on the ethics of the experiments.

Again, it's a matter of trusting experimental ^{authority} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and the experimenter ^{insisted that} no matter how high the shock was the person would ^{be} physical damage even though ^{evidence}

D.E. - You think they did believe they would not ^{be} damaged?

Q Some of them ^{those} ^{who had that kind of faith} authority left responsibility to the authorities.... Have you seen the film? ⁱⁿ Most of the subjects showed conflict.

MBG - Dr. Kohlberg, have you ever asked yourself whether you could predict how you would have behaved in that situation? What have you answered?

How I would have behaved in Dan's situation ^{no,} because in that way there were no selfish costs ...

MBG - It would ^{if you weren't going to go to jail,} been much easier. ^{you} lose your job or your reputation.

^{They} Give you \$5 even

D.E.- That was a major part of the finding. You didn't need any saction to get people to do it.

Like Michael Bernard who safely non-comphred in My Lai...

(END OF TAPE)